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Abstract:  We try to comprehensively analyze the nuances of Central Bank’s intervention in 
the foreign exchange market under a managed float exchange rate regime. We employ a three 
regime threshold VAR model and identify two endogenously determined threshold values of 
exchange rate cycle beyond which the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) intervenes in the Indian 
Rupee–US Dollar (Re/$) exchange rate market. We find that, as FIIs flow in, RBI’s 
interventions, mainly through open market operations, are successful in bringing the Re/$ 
exchange rate within the desired band. Within the band, the RBI tries only to mitigate 
domestic inflationary conditions. 
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21. Introduction
There exists a plethora of studies analyzing the role of Central Bank’s intervention in the 
foreign exchange (forex) market. However, there is a lack of literature comprehensively 
analyzing the effectiveness of Central Bank’s intervention in the forex market under a 
managed float exchange rate regime. The analysis becomes even more nuanced when the 
central bank (CB) has other objectives (like inflation targeting) and/or when it does not reveal 
the band of the managed float. This paper makes a modest attempt to understand the nuances 
of such intervention when the CB tries to maintain the exchange rate within a desired band 
along with keeping a check on the domestic inflation level as foreign capital flows in. 
Economic theory tells us that intervention in the forex market by the CB is contingent upon 
the country’s exchange rate regime. Theoretically, the CB needs (does not need) to intervene 
if the country follows a fixed (flexible) exchange rate regime. Such behavior on part of the 
CB of a country becomes pivotal when we allow for capital flows ending up in the 
‘impossible trinity’ of the Mundell-Fleming framework1. When foreign capital flows into an 
economy, broadly two things can happen. If the country follows a flexible exchange rate 
regime (no intervention by the CB) capital flows would lead to an appreciation of the 
domestic currency which in turn may lead to current account deficit. However, if the country 
follows a fixed exchange rate regime, the CB would intervene by buying up foreign exchange 
to keep the exchange rate unchanged leading to an increase in the foreign exchange reserve of 
the country (Corden, 1994). 
Following the ‘impossible trinity’, it is obvious that the CB would give-up fixed exchange 
rate regime if the economy prefers an independent monetary policy along with free capital 
flows. However, capital flows can lead to inflationary situations if the CB does not take any 
sterilization measures. Thus, majority of the countries, particularly the developing ones, find 
it apt to follow a managed float regime2 which helps them to keep exchange rates within a 
desired band3 along with mitigating inflationary pressures that may arise due to partial 
intervention. Hence, the role of the CB becomes a mix of intervention and non-intervention 
depending on the desired and realized values of the exchange rates.
Empirical studies have extensively investigated the effectiveness of intervention of the CB in 
the forex market and using linear models, in the sense that parameters are considered to be 
fixed across time, have found mixed evidences (Baillie and Osterberg, 1997; Beine et al, 
2002; Bonser-Neal and Tanner, 1996). However, linear models have been criticised on the 
ground that they fail to capture the effectiveness of CB intervention in the forex market as the 
behavior of the CB changes in different scenarios (Hsieh, 1989, 1993; Brooks, 2001; Basci 
and Caner, 2005). One set of literature tried to address the problem using nonlinear regime 
switching models, focusing particularly on the effectiveness of such intervention in tackling 
volatility of exchange rates (Krager and Kuglar, 1993; Lee and Lai, 2011; Suardi, 2008; 
Taylor and Peel, 2000). As discussed above, the notion of a managed float exchange rate 
regime is non-intervention within a desired band coupled with intervention outside the 
desired band. Hence, a very low value of the conditional variance of exchange rate cannot 
1 Aizenman (2013), however, argues that foreign exchange reserves act as a buffer and helps particularly the 
developing economies by relaxing the policy trilemma constraints at least in the short-run.
2 See IMF (2016) for a detailed listing of countries according to their exchange rate regimes. 
3 Such that the domestic currency neither depreciates enough to initiate a speculative attack on the domestic 
currency leading to a currency crisis; nor appreciates enough to adversely affect the exports, jeopardizing the 
current account balance.
3ensure the possibility of it not going outside the desired band. Therefore, the primary 
objective of the CB might well be to keep the exchange rate within a desired band rather than 
merely addressing exchange rate volatility. Further, we argue that the non-linear models used 
in the existing literature (including the two regime double threshold GARCH model 
employed by Suardi, 2008) are not sufficient to comprehensively analyze the effectiveness of 
CB intervention under a managed float regime. 
This paper analyzes the problem using a threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) model. We 
argue that the CB of a country following a managed float exchange rate regime would act 
differently under three distinct scenarios – (i) zone of no intervention (within a desired band), 
(ii) zone of intervention when the exchange rate tends to reach the lower value of the band 
and (iii) zone of intervention when the exchange rate tends to reach the upper value of the 
band. Accordingly, the number of regimes in the TVAR model is chosen to be three. Further, 
as discussed later, Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests reject the null hypothesis of linear VAR model 
against both two-regime and three-regime TVAR models. In this paper we consider the case 
of India and analyze the effectiveness of the interventions of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
in influencing the Indian Rupee-US Dollar (Re/$) exchange rate4.
The stated aim of RBI is to dampen the fluctuations of the exchange rate. However, it has 
regularly intervened in the forex market through sale and purchase of foreign currency. 
Interestingly, the details are not made public (Basu, 2009; Behera et al, 2008). Still, the 
bulging foreign exchange reserve held by RBI5 speaks volumes about its intervention in the 
forex market (Baig et al, 2003). Moreover, India has adopted a managed float exchange rate 
regime since 1994 with an inflation targeting framework (IMF, 2016)6. Hence, it is highly 
probable that RBI attempts to keep the exchange rate within a desired band which is not 
disclosed to avoid speculative attacks on the Indian Rupee (Re)7. However, the Re/$ 
exchange rate has continually increased over time and hence, one might think that RBI 
doesn’t try to maintain a band per say and it intervenes only to smoothen out excessive 
volatility in exchange rates. 
Such understanding of the functioning of RBI coupled with limited public information of the 
RBI’s forex market interventions has generated a plethora of literature examining the role of 
RBI in addressing volatility of exchange rate. However, the results are again mixed – some 
find RBI has been successful in reducing the volatility (Baig et al, 2003; Behera et al. 2008) 
while others find the opposite (Goyal et al, 2012; Inoue, 2015). Analyses of different time 
periods coupled with different time series models may end up with these types of conflicting 
results. Now, it is highly probable that RBI does try to contain the exchange rate within a 
band which itself is not fixed but adjusts over time according to expectations and RBI 
intervenes only when the exchange rate approaches an alarming zone (either towards the 
upper band or towards the lower band) and it does not intervene when the exchange rate is 
4 Apart from reasons as specified later, Aizenman (2013) identifies India as a prime example of heavily using 
sterilization to counter potential inflationary effects of ballooning foreign exchange reserves and hence, makes 
the case of India a very apt choice for the purpose of analyzing central bank’s behaviour under managed float 
exchange rate regime. 
5 India’s foreign exchange reserve increased exponentially since 1993, touching a record high of $400 billion in 
October, 2017.
6 Till 1991, India followed a fixed exchange rate regime. 1992 was the year of dual exchange rate regime and 
India finally adopted a managed float in 1994. 
7 Whether RBI has actually managed the exchange rate with a target or not is also contested. Some empirical 
studies suggest that it does manage (Kohli, 2003; Jha, 2008) while others inferred that it can’t (Pattnaik et al., 
2003; Moore and Pentecost, 2006; Inoue and Hamori, 2009).
4within the band (within the band the RBI just tackles the domestic inflationary conditions). 
Hence, such conflicting results are a direct outcome of the misspecification of the model 
where it is assumed that intervention of RBI is same for all kind of situations while, in reality, 
RBI may be intervening only when the exchange rate moves away from the desired band and 
doesn’t intervene across all values of exchange rate just to address volatility. Thus, it is 
obvious  that whether  RBI has been successful in calming down exchange rate fluctuations 
or not would be a futile exercise until  one looks into (1) when does RBI intervene and (2) 
whether RBI has been successful in bringing the exchange rate back within the desired band 
when it drifts away (in either direction).
It is in this context we make an attempt to find out when does RBI intervene to influence the 
Re/$ exchange rate and examine whether it has been successful in attaining its goal of 
bringing the Re/$ exchange rate within a desired band along with keeping a check on the 
domestic inflation level as FII comes in8. We argue that the adjustment of the band, which 
itself is unknown, is a result of expectation based on the historically realized values. Hence, 
RBI would intervene if the exchange rate depreciates (or appreciates) by a significant 
magnitude beyond the expected (or desired) levels. 
We start with identifying these desired levels of the Re/$ exchange rate. For the purpose we 
employ the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to decompose the data into trend and cyclical 
components which can respectively be interpreted as the expected value of Re/$ exchange 
rate and the deviation of the Re/$ exchange rate from the long run expected value. A small 
absolute value of the cyclical component implies that the actual realization of Re/$ exchange 
rate is equivalent to the expected value. Moreover, a large deviation, either positive or 
negative, beyond some critical level, can be identified as the ‘intervention zone(s)’.  Next, 
two unknown critical values of the cyclical component have been considered as the two 
threshold values of the three regime TVAR model and are estimated by the method of 
nonlinear least square. Finally, we try to analyze whether RBI has been successful in bringing 
the exchange rate back within the desired band if it has drifted away. This we have done by 
analyzing the short-run dynamics using TVAR analysis within each of the three zones as 
identified by the threshold values. One must note that these relationships would vary 
according to the three regimes (exchange rates are within a desired band, exchange rate 
depreciating significantly from the expected value and exchange rate appreciating 
significantly from the expected value) as the interventions of RBI would vary across different 
regimes. 
We have found that RBI does not intervene in the Re/$ exchange rate market when the Re/$ 
exchange rate lies within a desirable band as endogenously determined by the two threshold 
values and it only tries to mitigate domestic inflationary conditions within the band. 
However, RBI does intervene in the forex market to influence the Re/$ exchange rate when 
the Re depreciates (or appreciates) more than the expected value indicated by the zone above 
(below) the upper (lower) threshold and, most importantly, such interventions are successful 
in bringing the Re/$ exchange rate within the desired band. Further, we find that, like other 
developing country counterparts, the RBI allows for depreciation of Re more than 
appreciation. Hence, proper theoretical understanding of the CB’s functioning under a 
managed float exchange rate regime coupled with proper econometric modelling can resolve 
the ambiguity in the existing literature (Baig et al, 2003; Behera et al. 2008; Goyal et al, 
8 Both FII and FDI come to India and are equally important for the Indian economy. However, unlike FDIs, FIIs 
are highly volatile and sudden changes in the inflow of net FII may call for drastic measures by RBI which are 
not required in the case of FDI due the steady nature of its flow.
52012; Inoue, 2015) while analyzing the effectiveness of CB’s intervention in forex market. 
We also find that open market operation is more effective as a policy tool of RBI as 
compared to CRR.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the data and descriptive 
statistics of the variables used in this study. Section 3 provides the methodology of the 
analyses. Empirical results are given in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes the findings and 
concludes.
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The variables used in this analysis comprises of net Foreign Institutional Investment (FII), 
inflation (INF), net open market purchase of securities by RBI (OMO), change in the Cash 
Reserve Ratio (DCRR) and the exchange rate cycle of the Re/$ exchange rate (ERS). 
In this study we have chosen FII over foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI goes in to the 
production and remains in the host nation for considerably longer periods of time unlike FII 
which is highly volatile9. Both FII and FDI inflows are significant for the Indian economy. 
Net inflow of FDI into the Indian economy has increased steadily from US$ 315mn in 1992-
93 to US$ 35.6bn in 2016-17. Net inflow of FII into the Indian economy has increased from 
US$ 1mn in 1992-93 to US$ 40.9bn in 2014-15 and then again falling to US$ 7.7bn in 2016-
17. These sudden changes in the inflow of net FII, as compared to net FDI (see Figure 1), 
may call for drastic measures by RBI to intervene in both forex market to influence the Re/$ 
exchange rate and domestic market to mitigate inflationary situations. 
Figure 1: Inflow of Net FDI and Net FII into India (1992-93 – 2016-17)
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The time series of annual INF is calculated from the consumer price index (CPI) by the 
formula ( ). We calculate DCRR as . (𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 ‒ 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 ‒ 4)/𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 ‒ 4 (𝐶𝑅𝑅 𝑡 ‒ 𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡 ‒ 1)
Exchange rate cycle, ERS, is calculated from the quarterly data of Re/$ exchange rate by HP 
filtering. A detailed discussion of HP filtering to separate trend and cyclical component is 
provided later in Section 3. All data except CPI is taken from the official website of RBI 
9 There has been a considerable volume of literature that tried to analyze the determinants of foreign capital 
inflow (in particular FII) in to India [Chakrabarti (2001), Rai and Bhanumurthy (2004) and Sikdar (2006)]. 
See Coondoo and Mukherjee (2004) for an explanation of the volatility of FII for the case of India. 
6while data on CPI, to compute INF, has been taken from Federal Reserve Economic Data 
(FRED). 
The period of this study is 1997Q4 to 2016Q2 (75 quarters) owing to availability of quarterly 
data over all the variables used in this study. We have chosen quarter as the unit of time for 
our analysis as opposed to month (Baig et al, 2003; Behera et al, 2008 and Inoue, 2015) or 
day (Goyal et al, 2012) because macroeconomic changes in a large economy like India take 
time to adjust; for example, a monetary policy taken by RBI would very unlikely be able to 
achieve its targets in a month10, not to speak of a day.
In Table 1 we present the summary statistics for all five variables11 used in this study. FII, 
INF and OMO are found to be positively skewed, whereas the skewness of DCRR is 
negative. Though the skewness of ERS is negative, the magnitude is very small. The value of 
kurtosis is around 3 for FII, INF and ERS, but OMO and DCRR have kurtosis greater than 3. 
Except ERS all the variables are not normal suggested by Jarque-Bera (JB) test. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of all the variables
FII INF OMO DCRR* ERS
 Mean 2942.536 7.007 61.167 -0.078 0.025
 Median 1041.500 6.387 -8.401 0.000 -0.002
 Maximum 19251.000 17.858 909.940 1.000 5.766
 Minimum -6564.070 0.468 -265.464 -2.750 -5.044
 Std. Dev. 5017.709 3.399 240.703 0.527 2.107
 Skewness 0.993 0.855 1.884 -2.252 -0.093
 Kurtosis 3.792 3.576 6.207 12.035 3.498
 Jarque-Bera 14.084 10.046 75.482 314.230 0.872
 Probability (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.65)
ADF -5.684 -4.160 -4.590 -7.804 -4.700
value𝑝 ‒ (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
𝑄(4) 12.61 116.81 40.673 2.467 48.582
value𝑝 ‒ (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.65) (0.00)
WDmax** 17.4838 22.1433 17.9345 30.8889 25.2888
*CRR is found to be  variable with ADF test statistic and p-value is -1.6945 and 0.74 respectively. 𝐼(1)
Hence, we have taken first difference of CRR for the VAR analysis. 
** The critical value of WDmax test at 5% level of significance is 15.59.
We have performed augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test for unit root and found all the 
variables as stationary. As our data is in quarterly frequency we have calculated Ljung-Box 
test up to forth order autocorrelation and found that except DCRR all the variables have 
significant autocorrelation. 
Given stationary series of FII, INF, OMO, DCRR and ERS we tested for structural stability 
of individual time series. In absence of structural breaks in the individual series one might 
infer a stable linear econometric relationship among the variables. The assumption of a stable 
linear econometric relationship among the variables would not hold true in the presence of 
10 However, we have done the same analyses using monthly data and found no statistically significant results 
(which are available on request). This further supports our choice of quarter as the unit of time. 
11 Seasonality of all the variables are tested by method of seasonal dummy variable and found no seasonality in   
all the variables.
7structural breaks. In presence of structural breaks, therefore, one might opt for either phase 
wise linear models or nonlinear models (see Siliverstovs and van Dijk, 2003 for a detailed 
exposition). Given our objective of analyzing the relationship(s) of the above mentioned 
variables in different regimes, we have performed multiple structural break tests (Bai and 
Perron; 1998, 2003) for each series as a justification of choice of nonlinear models. The 
results of WDmax test12 of no structural break against any unknown number of structural 
break is given in Table 1. The test rejects the null hypothesis of no break for all the variables.
3. Methodology
As mentioned earlier, the objectives of this paper are to find out when does RBI intervene to 
influence the Re/$ exchange rate and examine whether RBI has been successful in attaining 
its goal of bringing the Re/$ exchange rate within a desired band along with keeping a check 
on the domestic inflation level as FII comes in. To do so, we have employed a three regime 
threshold VAR (TVAR) model where the threshold variable is taken as the past values of 
difference between Re/$ exchange rate and its long run trend value, which can be explained 
as an exchange rate cycle13. Two threshold values, specifying three different regimes, are 
considered as unknown and estimated along with other parameters. As a nonlinear model, 
TVAR allows different parameters in different regimes, which can capture impact of RBI’s 
intervention (either through OMO or CRR) on INF, Re/$ exchange rate and net FII inflow 
depending upon the regime itself. However, it must be noted that both OMO and CRR are 
endogenous in nature and are not exogenously chosen by RBI.
As discussed earlier, the existing studies find conflicting results on the effectiveness of RBI’s 
intervention in the forex market (Baig et al, 2003; Behera et al. 2008; Goyal et al, 2012; 
Inoue, 2015). According to our understanding, such results are obtained predominantly 
because of inappropriate econometric modelling which fail to capture the nuances of a 
managed float regime. We have considered a linear VAR model considering the above 
mentioned variables and compare the results with those of TVAR analysis so as to compare 
the effectiveness of linear and non-linear models in comprehensively capturing the nuances 
of CB intervention in forex market under a managed float exchange rate regime. 
3.1. Vector Autoregressive Model
The VAR model is specified as 
   (1) 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐶 + 𝐴1𝑦𝑡 ‒ 1 + 𝐴2𝑦𝑡 ‒ 2 + … + 𝐴𝑝𝑦𝑡 ‒ 𝑘 + 𝜀𝑡
where,  or , is  vector of 𝑦𝑡 = (𝐹𝐼𝐼   𝐼𝑁𝐹  𝑂𝑀𝑂  𝐸𝑅𝑆)' 𝑦𝑡 = (𝐹𝐼𝐼   𝐼𝑁𝐹  𝐷𝐶𝑅𝑅  𝐸𝑅𝑆)' 𝐶  4 × 1
constants,  is  matrix of slope coefficients, is the error term with 𝐴𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,…, 𝑘) 4 × 4 𝜀𝑡 𝐸(𝜀𝑡)
, and , and  is a positive integer representing the number of lags. = 𝟎 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑡) = Ω4 × 4 𝑘
3.2. The Threshold Vector Autoregressive (TVAR) Model
The three regime TVAR model is specified as 
12 As we are not doing subsample analysis, we have not computed the sequential break test and the 
corresponding break dates. 
13 When the actual value of the Re/$ exchange rate is more (less) than the expected value, we would say that the 
Re has depreciated (appreciated) more than its expected value.
8             (2)𝑦𝑡 =  {  𝐶1 + 𝐴11𝑦𝑡 ‒ 1 + 𝐴12𝑦𝑡 ‒ 2 + … + 𝐴1𝑘𝑦𝑡 ‒ 𝑘 + 𝜀𝑡                   𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 ≤  𝛾1𝐶2 + 𝐴21𝑦𝑡 ‒ 1 + 𝐴22𝑦𝑡 ‒ 2 + … + 𝐴2𝑘𝑦𝑡 ‒ 𝑘 + 𝜀𝑡        𝑖𝑓 𝛾1 <  𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 ≤  𝛾2𝐶3 + 𝐴31𝑦𝑡 ‒ 1 + 𝐴32𝑦𝑡 ‒ 2 + … + 𝐴3𝑘𝑦𝑡 ‒ 𝑘 + 𝜀𝑡                   𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 >  𝛾2
where  is defined as before.  and  are two unknown parameters, called threshold 𝑦𝑡 𝛾1 𝛾2
values, to be estimated.  are  constant vectors for th regime and 𝐶𝑗 (𝑗 = 1,2,3) 4 × 1 𝑗 𝐴𝑗𝑖
 are  coefficient matrices.  is typically estimated as negative   (𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑘;𝑗 = 1,2,3) 4 × 4 𝛾1
whereas the same for  is positive.  implies the previous exchange rate is 𝛾2 𝛾1 < 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 ≤ 𝛾2
closer to its expected value with some deviation in either direction whereas  and 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 ≤  𝛾1
 is capturing the too much appreciation and depreciation in the immediate past 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 >  𝛾2
of Indian rupee vis-à-vis US $, respectively. The number of lag ( ) in both the models is 𝑘
determined by minimizing the BIC criteria. 
Equation (2) can be re-written in a more compact way by the following equation
𝑦𝑡 = (𝐶1 + 𝐴11𝑦𝑡 ‒ 1 + 𝐴12𝑦𝑡 ‒ 2 + … + 𝐴1𝑘𝑦𝑡 ‒ 𝑘)𝐼(𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 ≤  𝛾1)+ (𝐶2 + 𝐴21𝑦𝑡 ‒ 1 + 𝐴22𝑦𝑡 ‒ 2 + … + 𝐴2𝑘𝑦𝑡 ‒ 𝑘)𝐼(𝛾1 < 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 ≤  𝛾2)
 + (𝐶3 + 𝐴31𝑦𝑡 ‒ 1 + 𝐴32𝑦𝑡 ‒ 2 + … + 𝐴3𝑘𝑦𝑡 ‒ 𝑘)𝐼(𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 >  𝛾2) + 𝜀𝑡
 (3)
where,  is the indicator variable which takes value one if the argument of the indicator 𝐼( ⋅ )
variable is true and zero otherwise.  
The parameter vector  consisting all the elements of and  𝜃 𝐶1, 𝐶2,  𝐶3 𝐴𝑗𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,…,𝑘;𝑗 = 1,2,3)
have been estimated by nonlinear least square by minimizing the function
    (4)𝜃 = argminθ∑𝑇𝑡 = 1𝜀2𝑡
 
where, 𝜀𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 ‒ (𝐶1 + 𝐴11𝑦𝑡 ‒ 1 + 𝐴12𝑦𝑡 ‒ 2 + … + 𝐴1𝑘𝑦𝑡 ‒ 𝑘)𝐼(𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 ≤  𝛾1)
     ‒ (𝐶2 + 𝐴21𝑦𝑡 ‒ 1 + 𝐴22𝑦𝑡 ‒ 2 + … + 𝐴2𝑘𝑦𝑡 ‒ 𝑘)𝐼(𝛾1 <  𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 ≤  𝛾2)
     ‒ (𝐶3 + 𝐴31𝑦𝑡 ‒ 1 + 𝐴32𝑦𝑡 ‒ 2 + … + 𝐴3𝑘𝑦𝑡 ‒ 𝑘)𝐼(𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 >  𝛾2)
The estimated parameters are asymptotically following normal distribution (See Hamilton 
J.D. (1994) for details).
3.3. Testing linearity against threshold VAR
We have done a linearity test of VAR model against a nonlinear threshold VAR model 
considering  as a threshold variable. To test the null hypothesis of linear VAR model 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1
(number of regime, ) against the alternative of threshold VAR model with =2 and 3,  𝑚 = 1 𝑚
we have followed the multivariate generalization of linearity test developed by Hansen 
(1999) and Lo and Zivot (2001).  The likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic is given by
𝐿𝑅 = 𝑇(ln |Σ0| ‒ ln |Σ1|)
where  and  are the covariance matrices of the error term for the null and the alternative Σ0 Σ1
model respectively. The values of the LR test are calculated using bootstrap method.𝑝 ‒
3.4. Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtering
It is mentioned earlier in this paper that whether RBI will intervene in the forex market or not 
depends on the appreciation and depreciation of the Re/$ exchange rate in an expected sense 
9and not in an absolute term. We have performed ADF test and found that Re/$ exchange rate 
series for the time period of the present study contain stochastic trend. Hence, we have 
decomposed it into trend and cyclical components using HP filtering and removed the trend 
component from the Re/$ exchange rate series to get a stationary cyclical component. 
Fluctuations around the trend line are considered to be short run cyclical fluctuations (which 
can be considered as expected appreciation or depreciation). HP filtering is widely used in 
case of macroeconometrics as a standard tool to separate out long run trend value from the 
short run fluctuations (cyclical components). The HP filter smoothed time series  can be  𝜏𝑡
calculated by minimizing the formula – 
𝑇
∑
𝑡 = 1(𝑥𝑡 ‒ 𝜏𝑡)2 + 𝜆 𝑇∑𝑡 = 2((𝜏𝑡 + 1 ‒ 𝜏𝑡) ‒ (𝜏𝑡 ‒ 𝜏𝑡 ‒ 1))2
where,  is a nonnegative smoothing parameter, taking a value 1600 for quarterly data;  is 𝜆 𝑇
the total sample size and  is the observed realization of exchange rate.  is referred as the 𝑥𝑡 𝜏𝑡
trend component and the difference between  and  is referred as the cyclical component, 𝑥𝑡 𝜏𝑡
specifically, exchange rate cycle (ERS) in our analysis.
4. Estimation Results
In this section we present the estimation results of our analyses. We begin with the results of 
linear VAR models. Two different VAR models have been estimated14 separately by taking 
either OMO or DCRR along with other three variables, mentioned above. In these models, it 
is clear that all the four variables are positively affecting their future values implying 
existence of significant auto correlation. Apart from that, it has been found that there is a 
positive impact of OMO on inflation. This result is trivial, as higher OMO implies higher purchase 
of securities by RBI leading to increase in the supply of Re in the economy and hence, in turn, causing 
higher inflation. The estimated coefficient is 0.00197 (significant at 10% level). As per the 
impact of exchange rate is concerned, it has been found that ERS is positively affecting FII 
(significant at 5% level). This implies that a depreciation of Indian rupee will increase the 
inflow of FII into the economy.  
On the other regression, where we have considered DCRR as an instrument of RBI, we have 
found an increase in ERS will significantly increase FII and reduce DCRR. Further, DCRR 
negatively affects ERS. The estimated coefficient is -0.93927 which is significant at 1% 
level. 
4.1. Results of testing linearity against TVAR model
The results of threshold tests are reported in Table 2. The null hypothesis ( ) considers a 𝐻0
linear VAR model against the alternative of TVAR model with two or three regimes15. The 
computation is based on Hansen (1996). We have considered 15% trimming observations 
while doing the test. Two null hypotheses, namely, one regime versus two regimes and one 
regime versus three regimes have been rejected indicating a three regime TVAR model, 
which is akin to our understanding of the intervention of CB in the forex market 
corresponding to three different regimes, would be a more robust methodology. For both the 
14 The detailed results are not given in the text to minimize the space and are available on request.
15 We tried to perform nonlinearity test of two regimes vs. three regimes, but the programming failed to provide 
the result. However, as discussed earlier, analysis of two-regime non-linearity is redundant in this case as 
either we would have a situation of a linear single regime framework or a non-linear three regime framework.
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tests the p-values are 0.00 when we estimate including OMO. When we consider DCRR, the 
p-values are 0.00 and 0.1.
Table 2: Results for testing linearity against threshold VAR model
1 versus  2 1 versus 3
Test statistic 61.14966 101.3435
-value𝑝 (0.00) (0.00)
Test statistic 55.40611 82.79983
-value𝑝 (0.00) (0.10)
4.2. Estimation results of three regime TVAR model
As discussed in Section 3 we have specified three regime TVAR models considering two 
different specifications16. In the first specification we have taken four variables, specifically, 
FII, INF, OMO and ERS, where the lag values of ERS has been considered as the threshold 
variable. In the second specification, instead of OMO we have considered DCRR as the 
instrument of RBI. We use these two different specifications to understand the relative 
effectiveness of the two instruments used by RBI to achieve its dual goal. 
The model that we estimate (as described in equation 3) is a four equation VAR model for 
three regimes with each equation having 15 parameters. Further, we have two threshold 
values which are estimated as parameters. Hence, in our model we have 62 parameters in 
total which are being estimated from 75 observations17. The number of lag(s) in both the 
TVAR models is determined by minimizing Bayesian information criterion (BIC).
4.2.1. Results of specification I
Here we provide the estimated results of the first specification where we consider OMO as 
the instruments. Two thresholds values,  and  turn out to be  and . 𝛾1 𝛾2 ( ‒ 1.49) ( + 1.81)
Couple of points are warranted here. First, the two endogenously determined threshold values 
show that the three regime specification is a correct one. The threshold value of  ( ‒ 1.49)
determines the limit when the RBI intervenes when the Re appreciates more than expected 
appreciation while the threshold value of  determines the limit when the RBI ( + 1.81)
intervenes when the Re depreciates more than expected depreciation. Second, the 
intervention is earlier  if there is unexpected appreciation as compared to ( ‒ 1.49)
depreciation . Hence, like other developing country counterparts, the RBI allows for ( + 1.81)
depreciation of Re more than appreciation to boost exports.
The threshold values divide all observations in three regimes – Regime I ( ‒ 5.04 ≤ 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1
), Regime II ( ) and Regime III (≤‒ 1.49 ‒ 1.49 < 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 ≤+ 1.81 + 1.81 < 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1
). Thus, RBI would intervene in the forex market if either the Re/$ exchange rate ≤+ 5.76
appreciates (Regime I) or depreciates (Regime III) more than expected. Within the band 
(Regime II), RBI’s intervention would be singularly targeted to tackle the domestic 
16 All computations of TVAR estimations have been done using tsDyn package of R.
17Such estimation is feasible without any problem as the estimated parameters of the VAR model asymptotically 
follow normal distribution (Hamilton, 1994).
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inflationary conditions and not the Re/$ exchange market. Figure 2 illustrates the two 
interventions zones (Regimes I and III) and the non-intervention zone (Regime II). 
In Regime I we have 17.1% observations of our total sample, in Regime II we have 61.5% 
observations and 21.4 % in Regime III. Table 3 provides the estimation results.
Figure 2: Zones of intervention and non-intervention 
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4.2.1.1. Regime I ( )‒ 𝟓.𝟎𝟒 ≤ 𝑬𝑹𝑺𝒕 ‒ 𝟏 ≤ ‒ 1.49
In Regime I, when the Re appreciates more than expected (such that ),  INF 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 ≤‒ 1.49
is affected only by its past value. OMO is positively affected by both its own lag and the lag 
of ERS. The estimated coefficients are 0.7101 and 51.854 and both are significant at 5% 
level. As Re depreciates (ERS increases), there is a tendency of the Re/$ exchange rate to 
move towards the tolerable zone (zone of non-intervention). However, such initial 
depreciation is occurring in a situation when Re has already appreciated more than expected 
and, hence, in order to bring the exchange rate back to the zone of no-intervention, RBI buys 
more securities from the domestic market and increases the supply of Re further. This proves, 
along with OMO not Granger causing INF in this regime, that RBI intervenes to bring the 
Re/$ exchange rate within the tolerable zone and this is captured by ERS positively Granger 
causing OMO. 
In this regime, FII and ERS are affecting each other after one lag. FII is positively affected by 
the lag of FII, INF and ERS and these are statistically significant at 5%, 1% and 1% level 
respectively. Depreciation (more than expected) of Re/$ exchange rate generates an 
expectation that RBI would intervene and in the next period Re/$ exchange rate would 
appreciate towards the expected value. Such depreciation of $ (vis-à-vis Re) in the next 
period would lead to exchange rate gain, ceteris paribus, for investors investing in $ in the 
Indian market. This would increase the volume of flow of FII in the next period. This is 
exactly captured by FII being positively granger caused by ERS. On the other side, if 
inflation is on the increase, then RBI would intervene in the domestic market by sale of 
Intervention Zone 
(Regime I)
No intervention Zone 
(Regime II)
Intervention Zone 
(Regime III)
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securities, that is, OMO should come down. As a result, supply of Re comes down and the 
Re/$ exchange rate appreciates creating a scope of exchange rate gain, ceteris paribus, for 
investors investing in $ in the Indian market. This would increase the volume of flow of FII 
in the next period. This is exactly captured by FII being positively Granger caused by INF.
In the ERS equation, it has found that the coefficient of the lag of ERS is -0.0002 and that of 
FII is 0.4796 which are significant at 1% and 5% level respectively. The relation between FII 
and ERS is straight forward. As FII increases, supply of $ increases in the economy leading 
to an appreciation of the Re and, hence, ERS falls.
Thus, in this regime as FII comes in, ERS falls, implying an appreciation of Re. However, as 
ERS falls, FII also falls which would lead to a depreciation of Re. A depreciation of Re 
would come along with an increased OMO pushing the Re/$ exchange rate further down 
towards Regime II.
Table 3: Estimation results of three regime TVAR model (Specification I)
intercept  𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑡 - 1 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑌𝑡 - 1 𝑂𝑀𝑂𝑡 - 1 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 - 1
Regime I ( )‒ 5.04 ≤ 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 ≤ ‒ 1.49
-4966.4261 0.6029** 1682.8112*** -9.1392 2154.5715***𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑡 (3762.635) (0.229) (453.003) (7.344) (586.671)
2.4021* -0.0001 0.5961*** 0.0018 -0.2921𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑌𝑡 (1.254) (0.000) (0.151) (0.002) (0.196)
142.6877 -0.0012 7.0931 0.7101** 51.854**𝑂𝑀𝑂𝑡 (164.426) (0.010) (19.796) (0.321) (25.637)
1.5789 -0.0002*** -0.1414 -0.0036 0.4796**𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 (1.371) (0.000) (0.165) (0.003) (0.214)
Regime II ( )‒ 1.49 < 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 ≤ + 1.81
2125.9365 0.4441** -166.5413 2.4288 -104.0673𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑡 (1379.388) (0.168) (208.071) (3.369) (549.014)
1.7871*** 0.0001** 0.5783*** 0.0025** 0.5783*𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑌𝑡 (0.460) (0.000) (0.069) (0.001) (0.183)
25.3814 0.0009 -2.1549 0.6219*** -29.9172𝑂𝑀𝑂𝑡 (60.279) (0.007) (9.093) (0.147) (23.992)
-0.1942 5.80E-06 0.0378 -0.001 0.7982***𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 (0.503) (0.0001) (0.076) (0.001) (0.200)
Regime III ( )+ 1.81 < 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 ≤ + 5.76
-6627.6919 1.0195** 658.3484 -9.8155* 2098.5757*𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑡 (3971.796) (0.404) (402.197) (5.181) (1118.504)
0.2987 5.40E-05 1.0078*** 0.0019 -0.2748𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑌𝑡 (1.323) (0.000) (0.134) (0.002) (0.373)
225.3683 -0.0532*** 22.6102 1.1615*** -139.6224***𝑂𝑀𝑂𝑡 (173.567) (0.018) (17.576) (0.226) (48.878)
3.2746** -0.0003** -0.1284 0.0053*** -0.3239𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 (1.447) (0.0001) (0.147) (0.002) (0.408)
Standard errors are given in parentheses. *, **, *** imply statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively.
4.2.1.2. Regime II ( )‒ 𝟏.𝟒𝟗 < 𝑬𝑹𝑺𝒕 ‒ 𝟏 ≤ + 𝟏.𝟖𝟏
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In the non-intervention zone (Regime II), we have found that FII, OMO and ERS are affected 
only by their past values, whereas INF is affected significantly by FII, ERS and OMO. The 
estimated coefficients are 0.0001, 0.5783 and 0.0025 and the corresponding levels of 
significance are 5%, 10% and 5% respectively. This clearly shows that in this regime RBI 
intervenes only to control INF and not the Re/$ exchange rate. As OMO increases, that is, net 
purchase of securities by RBI increases, supply of Re in the domestic market increases which 
increases INF in turn. Similarly, if the Re depreciates, there will be inflationary tendencies in 
the economy. Further, when FII increases, there will be an increase in the supply of Re by an 
equivalent amount of $ inflow and unless sterilized, would lead to inflation. Thus, in this 
regime, an increase in FII or depreciation of Re (as captured by ) would lead to  ERS > 0
inflation and RBI would use OMO (through sale of securities in the domestic market) to curb 
inflation.
4.2.1.3. Regime III ( )+ 𝟏.𝟖𝟏 < 𝑬𝑹𝑺𝒕 ‒ 𝟏 ≤ + 𝟓.𝟕𝟔
In the other intervention zone, when Re depreciates more than expected ( ), 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 >+ 1.81
FII, ERS and OMO all are affected by OMO. In this regime, interestingly, we find that INF is 
explained only by it past value. FII is positively affected by its own lag and the lag of ERS, 
which are statistically significant at 5% and 10% level and negatively by the lag of OMO 
which is statistically significant at 10% level. The explanation of positive effect of ERS on 
FII is same as in case of Regime I. Now, as OMO increases (which implies that net purchase 
of securities by RBI increases), it leads to an increased supply of Re (equivalent to the 
amount of securities purchased by RBI) in the economy resulting in a depreciation of the Re 
(vis-à-vis $). This would lead to an exchange rate loss, ceteris paribus, for investors investing 
in $ in the Indian market which, in turn, would decrease the volume of flow of FII in the next 
period. This is captured by FII is negatively affected by the lag of OMO. 
Further, if FII increases, there will be excess supply of $ which would lead to an equivalent 
increase in Re in the Indian domestic market creating excess liquidity. Hence, RBI would sale 
securities in the domestic market to reduce the excess liquidity in the domestic market. This 
is captured by the relation that OMO is negatively caused by FII with the estimated 
coefficient is -0.0532 which is significant at 1%. Similarly, if the Re depreciates more than 
expected, then there will be inflationary situation in the domestic market and RBI would sale 
securities to counter the same. This is again supported by the coefficient -139.6224 
significant at 1% level.
In this regime we find that ERS is positively and negatively Granger caused by lag of OMO 
and lag of FII respectively. An increase in OMO (which implies that net purchase of 
securities by RBI increases) would lead to an increased supply of Re (equivalent to the 
amount of securities purchased by RBI) in the economy. This would lead to depreciation of 
the Re (vis-à-vis $). This is captured by ERS is positively caused by lag of OMO which is 
significant at 1% level. Now, if FII increases, there will be excess supply of $ which would 
lead to an equivalent increase in Re in the Indian domestic market creating excess liquidity. 
Hence, RBI would sale securities in the domestic market to reduce the excess liquidity in the 
domestic market. This would lead to a reduction in the supply of Re and in turn, an 
appreciation of the Re/$ exchange rate. This is captured by ERS is negatively caused by lag 
of FII and significant at 5% level.
Thus, in this regime, we can see that if FII increases, then OMO comes down (RBI sales 
securities to counter excess liquidity in the domestic market) which in turn, would lead to an 
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appreciation of the Re/$ exchange rate. Thus, when Re depreciates more than expected, OMO 
acts as an instrument to counter that shock and bring the Re/$ exchange rate within a 
tolerable zone. Further, in this regime, OMO, though an instrument for tackling domestic 
inflation, does not affect INF, which is affected only by its past value.
4.2.2. Results of specification II
When we have taken DCRR (instead of OMO) as an instrument of RBI to control exchange 
rate within a band, the estimated threshold values (  and ) turn out to be  and 𝛾1 𝛾2 ( ‒ 1.492)
. The estimated value of the first threshold ( ) is similar to that in the ( + 0.703) 𝛾1
Specification I. The value of the second threshold ( ) is little lesser than that in the 𝛾2
specification I. Similar to the previous specification we have considered 15% trimming 
observation for testing and estimation of Threshold VAR. Total number of observation in 
these three regimes are 19.2%, 46.6% and 34.2% respectively. The estimation results of the 
second specification given in Table 4.
Table 4: Estimation results of three regime TVAR model (Specification II)
Intercept 𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 ‒ 1 𝐷𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡 ‒ 1 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1
Regime I ( )‒ 5.04 ≤ 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 ≤ ‒ 1.49
𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑡 -5986.8137(3910.5599)
0.5172**
(0.2419)
1280.0770***
(431.7873)
6089.8733
(4180.156)
1652.3380***
(557.7184)
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 2.594(1.6053)
-0.0001
(9.90E-05)
0.7768***
(0.1772)
-1.7828
(1.7159)
-0.04
(0.2289)
𝐷𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡 0.2315(0.4887)
-2.20E-05
(3.00E-05)
-0.0168
(0.054)
-0.0987
(0.5224)
-0.0477
(0.0697)
𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 1.1351(1.3586)
-0.0003***
(8.40E-05)
-0.1519
(0.1500)
1.8467
(1.4523)
0.4478**
(0.1938)
Regime II ( )‒ 1.49 < 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 ≤ + 0.703
𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑡 2909.5002*(1535.3504)
0.6237***
(0.1832)
-279.2506
(205.5540)
1563.3223
(2036.6803)
398.8013
(622.4078)
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 1.4923**(0.6303)
0.0001
(7.5e-05)
0.6786***
(0.0844)
1.8602**
(0.8361)
0.3862
(0.2555)
𝐷𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡 -0.1136(0.1919)
1.1e-05
(2.3e-05)
-0.0101
(0.0257)
-0.1118
(0.2545)
-0.1379*
(0.0778)
𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 -0.4545(0.5334)
-9.1e-06
(6.4e-05)
0.0610
(0.0714)
-0.8364
(0.7076)
0.6757***
(0.2162)
Regime III ( )+ 0.703 < 𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 ≤ + 5.76
𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑡 -1996.7844(2177.6918)
0.1653
(0.2738)
730.6386**
(349.8834)
1880.7787
(1350.7003)
263.4912
(801.7546)
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 -0.0079(0.8939)
0.0001
(0.0001)
0.9818***
(0.1436)
-0.2014
(0.5545)
-0.0251
(0.3291)
𝐷𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡 -0.3784(0.2722)
1.5e-05
(3.4e-05)
0.0405
(0.0437)
0.1446
(0.1688)
-0.0184
(0.1002)
𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑡 0.6279(0.7566)
5.7e-05
(9.5e-05)
-0.1407
(0.1216)
-1.4222***
(0.4693)
0.5702**
(0.2785)
Standard errors are given in parentheses. *, **, *** imply statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.
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In Regime I the results are almost similar to those under Specification I. The signs of the 
estimated coefficients and the respective levels of statistical significance for the FII, INF and 
ERS equations remain unchanged. However, change in CRR is not affected by any variable 
in this regime contrary to Specification I where OMO is affected by the lag values of itself 
and the lag of ERS. 
In the non-intervention zone (Regime II) we find that DCRR is positively affecting inflation 
which is significant at 5% level. This result is counter intuitive as RBI would increase CRR 
to reduce inflation. Hence, CRR fails to achieve its target of mitigating inflation which OMO 
successfully does (as we have found under Specification I). This result justifies RBI’s 
decision of keeping CRR unchanged since 2013 Q1 at 4.00. Further, lag values of FII and 
ERS no more remain statistically significant under this specification. However, as expected, 
ERS is negatively affecting DCRR (significant at 10% level) as increase in CRR would 
reduce the supply of Re. The lag of ERS continues to affect ERS under this specification.
In Regime III under this specification, FII is only affected by the lag of INF (positively at 5% 
level of significance). INF is positively affected only by its lag value at 1% level of 
significance. ERS is affected negatively by DCRR (significant at 1% level) and positively by 
its own lag (significant at 5% level). Hence, one may infer that increasing CRR would help 
RBI to bring the Re/$ exchange rate within the tolerable zone. 
5. Conclusion
There is a lack of literature comprehensively analyzing the effectiveness of such intervention 
under a managed float exchange rate regime. This paper makes a modest attempt to 
understand when does the RBI intervene in the Re/$ exchange market and whether such 
intervention is successful in achieving its goal of bringing the Re/$ exchange rate within a 
desired band along with keeping a check on the domestic inflation level as FII comes in. We 
find that non-linear models are more robust in capturing the effectiveness of such 
intervention and hence, we employ a three regime threshold VAR model. 
Our analyses confirm that RBI does not intervene when the Re/$ exchange rate lies within a 
desirable band as endogenously determined by the two threshold values of ERS (the 
difference between actual and expected values of Re/$ exchange rate). Within the band RBI 
intervenes only to address domestic inflation. However, RBI does intervene in the forex 
market to influence the Re/$ exchange rate when the Re depreciates (or appreciates) more 
than the expected value indicated by the zone above (below) the upper (lower) threshold. 
Moreover, such interventions are successful in bringing the exchange rate within the desired 
band. These results resolve the ambiguity regarding effectiveness of RBI’s intervention in 
Re/$ exchange rate market in the existing literature (Baig et al, 2003; Behera et al. 2008; 
Goyal et al, 2012; Inoue, 2015). Further, we find that, like other developing country 
counterparts, the RBI allows for depreciation of Re more than appreciation. 
These findings have two serious implications – (1) Given the realized values of the Re/$ 
exchange rate, one can estimate the long-run expected value of the Re/$ exchange rate and 
following this methodology, in turn, can successfully predict not only the time of RBI’s 
intervention, but the direction and magnitude as well. Moreover, for the purpose one does not 
require to know the exact values of the unknown limits of the band within which RBI tries to 
arrest the Re/$ exchange rate. (2) Lack of comprehensive understanding of a CB’s 
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functioning under managed float exchange rate regime and/or incorrect model specification is 
the fundamental cause of economists arriving at conflicting results when evaluating the 
effectiveness of RBI in addressing exchange rate volatility. 
We also find that open market operation is more effective as a policy tool of RBI as 
compared to CRR. This result justifies RBI’s decision of keeping the CRR unchanged since 
2013Q1. This might well signal the emergence of a strong financial market structure in the 
Indian economy. 
We also find that apart from its past values, net FII inflow in to the Indian economy depends 
on the difference between actual and expected values of Re/$ exchange rate (ERS) and hence, 
in turn, on RBI’s intervention outside the band defined by the endogenous threshold values of 
ERS.
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